Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Case No. 24-983 (2026).
A defendant is liable under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act for trafficking in "property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government" when it uses the physical property to which a United States national owns a claim, and the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant's conduct would have interfered with a property interest that would still exist in a counterfactual world without confiscation.
James v. Hernandez, Case No. 1D2025-0015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026).
A general contractor is not vicariously liable for the negligence of a specialty subcontractor who operates as an independent contractor where the contractor controls only outcomes, scheduling, and specifications rather than the subcontractor's methods of performing the work.
Priest v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., Case No. 1D2024-1577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026). The pre-suit notice requirement of Florida Statutes section 627.70152 does not apply retroactively to property insurance policies issued before the statute's July 1, 2021, effective date because the statute contains no clear legislative expression of retroactive intent.
City of Tampa v. Liberty Hospitality Management, LLC, Case No. 2D2025-0069 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026).
A partial final judgment that is legally and factually interrelated with claims that remain pending does not constitute a separate and distinct cause of action under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k) and must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Nichols v. French, Case No. 2D2024-2883 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026).
A trial court lacks discretion to deny a timely motion for trial de novo following nonbinding arbitration under Florida Statutes section 44.103(5), Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h), and imposition of additional procedural requirements beyond timely filing as a condition of the right to trial is impermissible.
Ferguson v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Case No. 3D25-1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
A government official who personally oversaw litigation and had knowledge of a party's recordkeeping practices qualifies as a "qualified witness" sufficient to authenticate billing records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, but a trial court awarding costs that are ordinarily not taxable must make specific findings identifying those costs and the unique and extraordinary circumstances justifying their award.
Kuluz v. Monroe County, Case No. 3D25-0500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
Upgrading a driveway that is internal to a property and closed to the public does not trigger the replat requirement under the Monroe County Code, and a county settlement that adopts a Code interpretation consistent with a state statutory definition does not constitute an ultra vires zoning contract.
Reardon v. RJConsulting 4005 LLC, Case No. 3D26-0418 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
A party that fails to timely appeal or seek rehearing of a final judgment that fully adjudicated all claims between the parties cannot revive appellate jurisdiction by filing a subsequent motion for summary judgment on an amended complaint and appealing the denial of that motion.
Dana Entertainment, Inc. v. Tucan & Baru Brickell, LLC, No. 3D25-1904 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
A trial court abuses its discretion by appointing a receiver without notice, a hearing, sworn testimony, an affidavit, or a verified pleading, and by setting a receiver's bond in an amount grossly inadequate in relation to the receivership entity's annual revenue.
Material Handling Systems, Inc. v. United Granite Penna, LLC, Case No. 4D2025-1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026).
Under Florida Statutes section 682.11(2), as amended in 2013, an arbitrator has authority to decide attorney’s fees when a statutory or contractual basis for recovery exists, and a party that submits fee claims to the arbitrator and receives an adverse ruling may not bypass the arbitration process by petitioning a trial court for those fees.
Lee County v. Captiva Civic Association, Inc., Case No. 6D2025-0335 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026).
A settlement agreement that permanently prohibits a county from issuing building permits beyond a fixed dwelling-unit limit is unenforceable as an ultra vires contracting away of the county's police power, regardless of whether the opposing party is a developer or a civic association.
